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Unfair relationship claims: does Berry v Black Horse change the limitation position?

In Christopher Berry v Black Horse Limited [2026] EWCC 54, HHJ Glen held that claims under sections 140A–140C of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are not subject to statutory limitation under the Limitation Act 1980, regardless of the relief sought. The County Court decision challenges the previously accepted six-year limitation period for claims seeking financial relief, but the issue is not finally resolved.

Background

Mr Berry bought a Volkswagen Golf in 2005 using Black Horse finance arranged through the dealer. Black Horse paid the dealer £935.80 in commission, including a discretionary commission payment. There was no evidence that Mr Berry had been told about the commission or its amount.

He settled the finance around two years later but issued proceedings only in March 2023, alleging an unfair relationship and seeking relief under section 140B.

The District Judge dismissed the claim as time-barred, applying a six-year period from the end of the credit relationship. Mr Berry appealed.

Why did limitation not apply?

The appeal turned on the application by analogy of THG plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2026] UKSC 6. That unfair prejudice case concerned limitation in a statutory regime giving courts broad discretion to identify a state of affairs and grant relief; it did not decide the consumer-credit question.

Applying that reasoning, HHJ Glen characterised section 140A as a "state of affairs" provision: it allows the court to assess whether the creditor-debtor relationship is unfair, rather than imposing a statutory duty not to create an unfair relationship.

Section 140B then gives the court broad remedial discretion. There is no automatic entitlement to repayment of a particular sum.

The judge therefore held that the claim was neither an "action upon a specialty" under section 8 nor an action to recover a sum "recoverable by virtue of" an enactment under section 9 of the Limitation Act.

What about the previous six-year rule?

Earlier cases had proceeded on a different basis. In Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2023] UKSC 34, the Supreme Court considered when the six-year period began for an unfair relationship claim seeking financial relief. Potter v Canada Square Operations Ltd [2023] UKSC 41 concerned postponement under section 32.

HHJ Glen distinguished those cases: neither had determined whether the Limitation Act applied at all. An assumption on which litigation proceeds is not the same as a decision on the point. He also distinguished Rahman v Sterling Credit Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 496, which THG had not formally overruled, and treated the relevant section 9 discussion in Patel v Patel [2009] EWHC 3264 as obiter.

Does this mean there is no time limit?

The absence of statutory limitation does not make delay irrelevant. HHJ Glen held that the court can address stale claims through its discretion under section 140B. Significant delay after a borrower knew, or ought to have known, of the alleged unfairness may weigh against relief.

Limitation periods may still provide a useful yardstick, particularly for retrospective financial compensation. Evidence of what the borrower knew, when they should have discovered the facts and why they delayed will therefore remain important.

The outcome

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal set aside, but Mr Berry did not thereby obtain substantive relief. The case was remitted to the District Judge for rehearing with further submissions on delay only. Applying the discretionary test, the District Judge might still reach the same result.

Why does Berry matter?

The implications extend beyond motor finance to other qualifying consumer credit relationships. For claimants, Berry potentially removes a preliminary limitation obstacle. For lenders, the focus may shift to the claimant’s knowledge, conduct and delay, and whether relief is appropriate.

Not yet the final word

The parties indicated an intention to appeal. HHJ Glen could not grant permission for a further appeal under CPR 52.7; permission would need to be sought from the Court of Appeal. As at 2 November 2026, we have not independently verified whether an application has been filed or determined.

Berry is an important development, not the final word. Parties should not treat the limitation issue as settled, and claimants pursuing historic agreements should still be ready to explain substantial delay.

The absence of statutory limitation does not make delay irrelevant.

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